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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000712

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SUBJECT: U/S BURNS MEETS WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

Classified By: Amb. Victoria Nuland for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

(C) Summary: In a meeting December 5 with NATO Secretary General (SYG) De Hoop Scheffer, U/S Burns discussed strategy for NATO's 2008 and 2009 Summits, which should focus on NATO's global missions and partnerships, enlargement, and Afghanistan. U/S Burns advised careful consideration of the proposed Afghanistan Contact Group, suggesting that results remained key and existing coordinating bodies might also need strengthening. The SYG said he is concerned that some European leaders lack the will to do what is needed in Afghanistan, and worried where replacements for Dutch and British soldiers will come from once these troops rotate out of southern Afghanistan in 2008. The SYG asked for high-level U.S. assistance in engaging Pakistan, and said he will travel to Pakistan to meet with President Musharraf. The SYG and U/S Burns agreed to try to organize a reinforced NAC at Political Directors' level in January 2007 to coordinate policy on Afghanistan and Kosovo. The SYG underscored the need for more open NATO - EU consultations, as well as increased EU involvement in Afghanistan and Kosovo. De Hoop Scheffer agreed to U/S Burns's suggestion that he visit Washington in the spring of 2007. End Summary.

Afghanistan Contact Group Proposal

- 12. (C) The SYG raised the proposed Afghanistan Contact Group, as suggested by President Chirac at the Riga Summit, and asked for U.S. thoughts. U/S Burns responded that, while he had yet to speak with Secretary Rice, the proposal required careful consideration. While Bosnia had a need for a "Paddy Ashdown", Afghanistan has a democratically elected, sovereign government, that needed to be empowered rather than constrained by any proposals. Karzai had expressed his concerns to Ambassador Neumann, including his unhappiness that the French had not consulted him before floating the proposal.
- 13. (C) U/S Burns pointed out that the existing Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) already provides a venue for coordination which could be strengthened. He questioned the SYG about the proposed membership of the Contact Group, noting that countries like Pakistan and India should be included, although having too many participants would make the proposed group unwieldy.
- 14. (C) The SYG said that anything more than ten participants would be unmanageable. He noted a potential UK proposal that would limit participation to the G7, NATO, and the UN. De Hoop Scheffer agreed that while the JCMB is useful, coordination among civilian organizations is weak. Given how the proposal was floated by President Chirac, supported by Chancellor Merkel at the Riga Summit he would need to

address the issue. U/S Burns said we would provide additional USG views on the proposal soon. The SYG and U/S Burns agreed to try to organize a Reinforced NAC at Political Directors level on Afghanistan and Kosovo in January.

Allies in Afghanistan

¶5. (S/NF) U/S Burns asked the SYG how he plans to keep pressure on allies to remove caveats on their troops in Afghanistan. The SYG responded that he "will continue to do what we are already doing." He said he was "worried about Europe" - in particular where replacements for the UK and Dutch troops deployed in RC-South will come from in 2008 -but more generally about the lack of political will on the part of some leaders. He had hoped that Chancellor Merkel would both raise Germany,s profile in NATO and help "rein in" the French, adding that "her speeches are there, but her actions are not." He sees an increasing political populism in Europe, where "the center is losing to the fringes," adding that Europe is more and more inward looking. De Hoop Scheffer noted the need for more EU involvement in Afghanistan, including discussion at EU summits. The SYG emphasized that NATO needs "full U.S. pressure on Pakistan behind closed doors."

Kosovo

16. (C) U/S Burns said we now expect Martti Ahtisaari to make his recommendation in February 2007 for an independent Kosovo. Russia may difficult, but would not veto a resolution. Kosovo will inevitably have economic problems, and already suffered from high unemployment, and limited

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natural resources. Given these circumstances, it was important that Kosovo quickly receive international recognition and full UN status. De Hoop Scheffer said NATO will remain as a guarantor in the security field, while also building up Kosovo's security services. The SYG complained that it was unclear whether NATO or the EU has the lead in Kosovo, in part because the two organizations do not speak at the political level. He commented that the EU realizes it will have a large task helping build Kosovo's economy, and that the EU needs to "take Kosovo by the hand" to ensure its economic growth. He asked for U.S. assistance in pressing Allies to address both Kosovo and Afghanistan more seriously within the EU framework, including at the upcoming EU Summit.

Iran

17. (C) De Hoop Scheffer expressed appreciation for U/S Burns's update of ongoing efforts to get an UNSCR on Iran and to create additional avenues outside of the UN to keep the pressure on Tehran, including an effective program to discourage some types of lending.

Future Summit Strategies

18. (C) The SYG noted the success of the Riga Summit, and said the next step will be developing a workplan for the 2008 Summit. This summit should focus more on enlargement, reconfirming NATO,s "open door" policy. The 2009 Summit should then focus on larger NATO "concepts", including global partners. U/S Burns agreed it is not too soon to look at summit strategies, including how NATO can make the "leap to a global mission," and that he is also enthusiastic about the global partners concept. He underscored the importance of the Afghanistan mission to the alliance, and agreed with the SecGen on maintaining an "open door" policy. In addition, the way NATO operates needs to be modified; while

issues of "war and peace" will still require a consensus, other decisions could be agreed by a simple majority. The SYG and Burns both endorsed an update of NATO's Strategic Concept in time for the sixtieth anniversary summit in 2009.

Ambassador Nuland added that homeland security needed to be addressed as well. U/S Burns voiced USG support for Bucharest as the 2008 Summit host. The SecGen responded that a "large majority of countries" favor Lisbon, but that he would work towards an agreement.

- 19. (C) The SYG said there is a large degree of "immobility" within the European Union, which puts the "focus of spreading the zone of security on NATO." He envisioned strategic discussions at NATO gaining more "weight," as the EU was doubting its own identity. De Hoop Scheffer stressed the need to fully integrate the Balkan states into the Euro-Atlantic structures; if not, in the future there may be a need to "send 60,000 soldiers back in to the Balkans."
- 110. (C) De Hoop Scheffer also pointed out the Riga Summit had provided openings in both missile defense and energy security which should be pursued. De Hoop Scheffer agreed to U/S Burns' suggestion that he visit Washington in the spring of 2007.

Participants

111. (U) Participants:

U.S. Delegation:

U/S Burns

Ambassador Nuland

Ms. Sumona Guha, EUR

Robert Kemp, USNATO

NATO Staff:

Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer

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Deputy Secretary General Minuto Rizzo

Amb. Schuwer, Acting Director, Private Office

Mr. Joe Manso, Deputy Director, Private Office

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 $\P12$. (U) U/S Burns's staff has cleared this cable. OLSON